PROBLEMS
WITH GEMS CENTRAL TABULATOR
By
Bev Harris published August 26, 2004 by BlackBoxVoting.org
ISSUE:
Manipulation
technique found in the Diebold central tabulator -- 1,000 of these
systems are in place, and they count up to two million votes at
a time.
By entering a 2-digit code in a hidden location, a second set
of votes is created. This set of votes can be changed, so that
it no longer matches the correct votes. The voting system will
then read the totals from the bogus vote set. It takes only seconds
to change the votes, and to date not a single location in the
U.S. has implemented security measures to fully mitigate the risks.
This program is not stupidity or sloppiness. It was designed and
tested over a series of a dozen version adjustments.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS: If you are in a county that
uses GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS 1.18.19, or GEMS 1.18.23, your secretary
or state may not have told you about this. You're the one who'll
be blamed if your election is tampered with. Find out for yourself
if you have this problem: Black Box Voting will be happy to walk
you through a diagnostic procedure over the phone. E-mail Bev
Harris or Andy Stephenson to set up a time to do this.
FOR THE MEDIA: Harris and Stephenson will be
in New York City on Aug. 30, 31, Sep.1, to demonstrate this built-in
election tampering technique. Members of congress and Washington
correspondents: Harris and Stephenson will be in Washington D.C.
on Sept. 22 to demonstrate this problem for you. Whether you vote
absentee, on touch-screens, or on paper ballot (fill in the bubble)
optical scan machines, all votes are ultimately brought to the
mother-ship; the central tabulator at the county which adds them
all up and creates the results report.
These systems are used in over 30 states and each counts up to
two million votes at once. The central tabulator is far more vulnerable
than the touch screen terminals. Think about it: If you were going
to tamper with an election,
would you rather tamper with 4,500 individual voting machines,
or with just one machine, the central tabulator which receives
votes from all the machines? Of course, the central tabulator
is the most desirable target.
FINDINGS: The GEMS central tabulator program
is incorrectly designed and highly vulnerable to fraud. Election
results can be changed in a matter of seconds. Part of the program
we examined appears to be designed with election tampering in
mind. We have also learned that election officials maintain inadequate
controls over access to the central tabulator. We need to beef
up procedures to mitigate risks. Much of this information, originally
published on July 8, 2003, has since been corroborated by formal
studies (RABA) and by Diebold's own internal memos written by
its programmers.
Not a single location has yet implemented the security measures
needed to mitigate the risk. Yet, it is not too late. We need
to tackle this one, folks, roll up our sleeves, and implement
corrective measures. In Nov. 2003, Black Box Voting founder Bev
Harris, and director Jim March, filed a Qui Tam lawsuit in California
citing fraudulent claims by Diebold, seeking restitution for the
taxpayer. Diebold claimed its voting system was secure. It is,
in fact, highly vulnerable to and appears to be designed for fraud.
The California Attorney General was made aware of this problem
nearly a year ago. Harris and Black Box Voting Associate Director
Andy Stephenson visited the Washington Attorney General's office
in Feb. 2004 to inform them of the problem. Yet, nothing has been
done to inform election officials who are using the system, nor
have appropriate security safeguards been implemented.
In fact, Gov. Arnold Swarzenegger recently froze the funds, allocated
by Secretary of State Kevin Shelley, which would have paid for
increased scrutiny of the voting system in California.
On
April 21, 2004, Harris appeared before the California
Voting Systems Panel, and presented the smoking gun document showing
that Diebold had not corrected the GEMS flaws, even though it
had updated and upgraded the GEMS program.
On August 8, 2004, Harris demonstrated to Howard
Dean how easy it is to change votes in GEMS, on CNBC TV.
On
August. 11, 2004, Jim March formally requested that the
California Voting Systems Panel watch the demonstration of the
double set of books in GEMS. They were already convened, and the
time for Harris was already allotted.
Though the
demonstration takes only 3 minutes, the panel refused to allow
it and would not look. They did, however, meet privately with
Diebold afterwards, without informing the public or issuing any
report of what
transpired.
On August 18, 2004, Harris and Stephenson, together
with computer security expert Dr. Hugh Thompson, and former King
County Elections Supervisor Julie Anne Kempf, met with members
of the California Voting Systems Panel and the California Secretary
of State's office to demonstrate the double set of books. The
officials declined to allow a camera crew from 60 Minutes to film
or attend. The Secretary of State's office halted the meeting,
called in the general counsel for their office, and a defense
attorney from the California Attorney General's office. They refused
to allow Black Box Voting to videotape its own demonstration.
They prohibited any audiotape and specified that no notes of the
meeting could be requested in public records requests.
The undersecretary of state, Mark Kyle, left the meeting early,
and one voting panel member, John Mott Smith, appeared to sleep
through the presentation.
On August 23, 2004, CBC TV came to California
and filmed the demonstration.
On August 30 &31, Harris and Stephenson will
be in New York City to demonstrate the double set of books for
any public official and any TV crews who wish to see it.
On September 1, another event is planned in New
York City, and on Sept. 21, Harris and Stephenson intend to demonstrate
the problem for members and congress and the press in Washington
D.C.
Diebold has known of the problem, or should have known, because
it did a cease and desist on the web site when Harris originally
reported the problem in 2003. On Aug. 11, 2004, Harris also offered
to show the problem to Marvin Singleton, Diebold's damage control
expert, and to other Diebold execs. They refused to look.
Why don't people want to look? Suppose you are formally informed
that the gas tank tends to explode on the car you are telling
people to use. If you KNOW about it, but do nothing, you are liable.
LET US HOLD DIEBOLD, AND OUR PUBLIC OFFICIALS, ACCOUNTABLE.
1) Let there be no one who can say "I didn't know.";
2) Let there be no election jurisdiction using GEMS that fails
to implement
all of the proper corrective procedures, this fall, to mitigate
risk.
RELATED LINKS:
THE NATIONAL BALLOT INTEGRITY PROJECT TASK FORCE:
http://www.ballotintegrity.org
WIRED'S E-VOTING COVERAGE:
http://www.wired.com/news/evote/
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